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More than ever, ideas matter to political historians: many have now taken an 
‘ideational turn’.1 This is especially true of students of the 1970s, the decade when a 
fierce ideological battle with huge consequences for the future raged over Britain’s 
ailing post-war settlement. By keeping the profit motive intact and leaving 
untouched most bastions of established power, but expanding the role of 
government and giving organized labour a bigger voice, some believed the 
settlement had permanently placed Britain somewhere between socialism and the 
free market.2 Sustained by what Paul Addison described as a limited ‘Whitehall 
consensus’, the settlement nonetheless remained the subject of keen ideological 
debate.3 Economic growth and popular affluence however meant that those who 
wanted to firmly wrest it towards socialism or the free market were largely excluded 
from influence within government. But once Britain’s mounting economic problems 
were compounded by the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973-4 and the country 
found itself in an inflation-fueled recession, the existential questions long asked by 
the far-left and radical right won new audiences beyond Whitehall.4  
If measured in strictly parliamentary terms it was the right that won this 
battle of ideas. Margaret Thatcher’s election as Prime Minister in 1979 certainly 
marked a turning point in public policy. In office she laid the foundations for a new 
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kind of settlement, a different ‘Whitehall consensus’, part of an international shift 
from ideas that favoured state intervention towards those supportive of economic 
liberalisation.5 This has led to an understandable historiographical emphasis on the 
ideas which informed Thatcher’s winning strategy and shaped measures she pursued 
in office.6  Betraying the roots of the ‘ideational turn’ in a state-centric historical 
institutionalism, this work also focuses on elite figures who ultimately contributed to 
party and government policy, giving sustenance to narratives that emphasise their 
agency in the breaking of one settlement and the making of another.7 The very 
weight of this literature contributes to the sense that the triumph of ‘Thatcherism’ 
was somehow inevitable.8  
As with most historical processes however other outcomes were possible. 
During the 1970s many socialists considered they might prevail: even members of 
Thatcher’s Shadow Cabinet believed, ‘Society was moving more left’.9 The growing 
influence of left-wing activists in the Labour party meant the February 1974 general 
election saw Harold Wilson enter Downing Street with a manifesto promising, ‘a 
fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of 
working people’. Indeed, Tony Benn, who helped shape that manifesto already 
thought, ‘Power has shifted to people on the shop floor’.10 Once in office Wilson and 
his successor James Callaghan nonetheless disavowed this pledge and tried to 
maintain the post-war settlement by pursuing measures that forced unemployment 
up and standards of living down. Despite that, Labour activists continued to argue 
for policies designed to transcend the settlement from the left.11 Benn in particular 
remained convinced Britain’s economic troubles necessitated a ‘new consensus’ 
based on workers’ control of industry and a massive expansion of government 
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intervention. He used his position as a Cabinet Minister to as he put it ‘educate’ the 
public through the traditional political means of making speeches that outlined his 
case.12  
Historians have yet to systematically and comprehensively explain why the 
ideas of the radical right, rather than those of the far-left, were the ones that came 
to be applied in government. It is nonetheless clear that this was not necessarily due 
to the merits of the ideas themselves. As Sheri Berman notes: ‘new ideas do not 
achieve prominence on their own but must be championed by carriers or 
entrepreneurs, individuals or groups capable of persuading others to reconsider the 
ways they think and act’.13 It is significant therefore that in what Peter Hall called an 
emerging ‘marketplace for ideas’, those associated with the radical right were 
advocated by prominent media commentators, members of City brokerage houses 
and a burgeoning number of newly-formed thinktanks - as well as the leader of the 
Conservative party.14 In contrast, socialist ideas had so few advocates Hall did not 
consider them worthy of mention. Labour’s parliamentary leadership undoubtedly 
did its best to refute Benn and his allies who were regularly defamed in the press 
and had no friends to speak of in the City. In that hostile institutional context a few 
speeches from an embattled socialist Cabinet minister were never likely to make 
much of an impression.  
Hall wanted to show how a ‘societal debate’ changed government economic 
thinking from the Keynesianism that underpinned the post-war settlement to the 
monetarism applied by Thatcher. Participants in this ‘debate’ comprised elite figures 
because Hall was only concerned with the specialised work of policy-making. While 
he recognised that winning elections largely decided which policies were applied in 
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office Hall was nonetheless uninterested in ideas that prevailed in the wider national 
culture beyond his ‘marketplace’. Popular ideas necessarily have a less distinct 
character to those associated with the purposive notions underpinning the creation 
of policy. But culture still provides what Berman calls ‘broad guidelines’ for popular 
politics, and is the terrain over which all parties must fight if they are to achieve 
power.15 Consequently, historians wishing to properly understand the politics of the 
1970s need to focus as much on popular culture as they do on elite policy-making. 
Historians of earlier periods long ago granted culture a constitutive ideational 
role. As E.P. Thompson suggested, if economic factors influenced how ordinary 
people saw their situation culture played a significant interceding function.16 Social 
scientists are also now inclined to give culture an important political role given it is 
the location where ‘different subjects, subjectivities and modes of calculation come 
to be naturalised’.17 As the sociologist Anne Swidler put it, culture helps shape ‘a 
repertoire or “tool kit” of habits, skills and styles from which people construct 
strategies of action’. Swidler nonetheless recognised that any national culture 
contains a diverse set of potential guides to action, meaning its influence will ‘vary 
across time and historical situation’.18 Given this, and that Stuart Hall’s early and 
otherwise highly influential analysis of ‘Thatcherism’ stressed how far changes in 
popular ideas explained rising support for the radical right, it is ironic so few political 
historians of the 1970s have taken culture seriously as an ideational resource.19 
There are however signs this situation is changing. In particular Dean Blackburn’s 
recent account of how socialist ideas underpinned much of Penguin Book’s non-
fiction list shows that the battle of ideas was keenly fought well beyond Hall’s 
exclusive ‘marketplace’.20  
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A Penguin book might reach at most a few hundred thousand readers, many 
of whom were already participants in the period’s Marxist renaissance. Historians 
interested in how millions of less obviously politically committed Britons were drawn 
into the battle of ideas need to look at television, for it was in the 1970s when the 
medium ‘came of age’ and began to play a significant role in the national culture.21 
By the start of the decade more than 90 per cent of households possessed a TV set 
and adults devoted on average 18 hours a week to watching it.22 Viewers had access 
to three channels, two of which were funded by a compulsory licence fee and run by 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as a public service. The third was financed 
through advertising and operated by one of fifteen regional affiliates to Independent 
Television (ITV), regulated by the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA).23 
Raymond Williams believed that, thanks to television by this decade, ‘for the first 
time a majority of the population has regular and constant access to drama’.24 
Britain possessed that which Dennis Potter called, ‘the nearest thing we are ever 
likely to get to a “theatre of the people”’.25 Most working in this ‘theatre’ saw their 
object as the provision of ostensibly value-free drama.26 Nonetheless from the early 
1960s TV was opened up to voices that challenged the existing order so as to reflect 
a society increasingly in conflict with itself. Censorship did not disappear, with those 
leading the BBC in particular wishing to protect the ‘Westminster consensus’ from 
criticism.27 Dramatists were nonetheless freer than ever before to explore once-
forbidden ideas. As a result, the lives of working people were represented in 
unprecedentedly realistic terms, for the people themselves as they sat in their 
homes.28  
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Many of these dramas, most prominently the soap opera Coronation Street, 
(ITV, 1960- ) studiously avoided tackling controversial topics.29 Some, however, like 
the series Sam (ITV, 1973-5) focused on the past and present of the working class so 
as to comment on issues of the moment. A small number of plays and series even 
sought to encourage viewers to embrace socialism. They were, as the radical BBC 
drama producer Tony Garnett put it, ‘an inspiration to action’ being designed to 
contribute to the left’s challenge to the post-war settlement.30 As a more 
conservative voice in the BBC complained, such dramas constituted ‘a form of 
political persuasion by other means’.31 This article focuses on the work of Jim Allen 
(1926-99) and Trevor Griffiths (b. 1935), the two leading socialist writers working in 
the medium at this time.32 Allen was a Trotskyist and Griffiths influenced by the New 
Left. Both had resigned from the Labour party during the 1960s due to their 
frustration with the parliamentary leadership’s moderation; so they sympathised 
with those in the party who wished to transform the post-war settlement from the 
left. If Tony Benn used speeches they employed drama to make their case. Allen 
spoke of wanting his plays to ‘ring a few bells and stir people up’, hoping ‘works 
canteens will be buzzing with discussion of the issues’ as a result and ‘galvanize’ 
working-class viewers to reject social democracy.33 Griffiths saw writing for TV as ‘a 
massively powerful way of intervening in society’s life’: it was the only way 
dramatists could address large numbers of working people.34  
Contributions to the 1962 Pilkington Report on Broadcasting revealed that 
many in authority believed TV shaped viewers’ thinking.35 Conservatives were 
especially worried by how the medium was starting to give radical ideas a platform, 
which was why Mary Whitehouse established the National Viewers’ and Listeners’ 
 7	
Association in 1965.36 The ideas contained in Allen and Griffiths’ dramas were 
anathema to such figures and they publicly refuted them. During her first leader’s 
speech to the 1975 Conservative conference Thatcher echoed Whitehouse’s 
concerns by describing Allen’s series Days of Hope as part of the left’s attack on ‘our 
national self-respect’.37 But it wasn’t just the right which felt threatened. Griffiths’ 
1976 series Bill Brand also goaded the centre-left Guardian to publish an editorial 
defending Parliament as the principal venue for progressive change.38  
This article has two related objects. It poses a substantive question: were 
nascent neo-liberals and long-time social democrats right to be concerned about the 
influence of Allen and Griffiths? To answer that query however means addressing a 
knotty methodological issue: what can historians reasonably say about the impact of 
television on vernacular ideas? This is a matter of importance to all interested in the 
communication of political ideas during the post-war period but especially during 
the fraught 1970s. The article draws these concerns together by systematically 
analysing the ways through which TV press critics working for the Daily Mirror and 
Daily Express tried to influence reactions to the men’s work. It shows how keenly 
journalists working in a little studied part of the newspaper industry encouraged 
millions of working-class readers to reject the dramatists’ ideas. The article thereby 
highlights not only the extensive nature of the battle of ideas but also the weight of 
those forces opposed to the socialist alternative to the ailing post-war settlement. 
 
The ideational effect of TV drama  
The historiography of television is in its infancy: it was only in 2007 that Helen 
Wheatley declared TV could be considered a ‘legitimate field of study’.39 Two years 
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later however Paddy Scannell claimed that as television had been established for 
seven decades historians were equipped to assess the effects of the medium. They 
not only possessed the requisite perspective he argued but the opening of the 
archives meant historians possessed the material with which to conduct analysis.40 
As Scannell’s work on the interwar BBC had outlined how far its radio output shaped 
popular ideas it was no revelation he was optimistic that historians would establish 
TV, a more powerful medium, had significantly influenced post-war Britain.41  
At least in regard to television’s impact on ideas other historians nonetheless 
believe it had a modest effect. Joe Moran suggested the medium’s importance 
‘stems from its slowly accrued habits and rituals, the way it mingles with our daily 
routines’.42 David Kynaston similarly claimed television had but two effects on the 
young: ‘it made them stay at home more, and made them go to bed later’.43 It is 
understandable why such historians hold this latter view. Most dedicated students 
of television history have avoided exploring the medium’s ideological effects. It is a 
common complaint that they have been too preoccupied with ‘messages rather than 
recipients’.44 Their focus has been on the production of programmes, the 
institutional politics in which that occurred, and broadcasters’ relations with 
government.45 Likewise, students of radical TV drama of the kind written by Allen 
and Griffiths have highlighted the production context that gave it shape, discussed 
its use of dramatic techniques or assessed how it represented certain subjects.46 If 
they refer to the impact of such work, as when Edward Brandt claimed Griffiths’ Bill 
Brand was ‘an unequalled example of television drama as a form of extended 
political dialogue’, they do so with precious little justification.47  
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If suffering from a lop-sided emphasis this work has nonetheless advanced an 
understanding of why certain messages reached the screen more than others and 
how TV depicted a variety of social and political issues. But it has done little to aid an 
appreciation of the ways audiences responded to what they watched. The likeliest 
reason for this imbalance is that assessing the production of messages is more 
straightforward than reconstructing their reception. The paper trail for the former 
can be followed with comparative ease, especially in a bureaucracy as officious as 
the BBC: methodological issues are simpler to resolve and conclusions can be drawn 
in a less ambiguous manner. In contrast, as Stuart Hood, Controller of BBC Television 
during the 1960s admitted, even contemporary broadcasters lacked evidence 
reliable enough to judge how viewers reacted to their programmes.48 Subsequent 
social scientists and students of culture who have made it their business to assess 
the ideological impact of TV have moreover produced work that emphasizes its 
complex, contingent and indirect character. Audiences are not blank slates upon 
which the screen imposes its meaning but can in subtle and various ways be 
influenced by what they watch.49 It was for these reasons Janet Thumim wrote of 
‘the impossibility of knowing an historical audience’, and claimed how viewers 
interpreted what they saw on the screen, ‘can only ever be a matter of 
speculation’.50 
Despite these issues some historians have recently attempted to move 
beyond pure conjecture. Despite the many difficulties surrounding the attempt, 
those interested in how television tackled race and immigration have drawn 
concrete conclusions about the medium’s ideational impact.51 Analysing a 
contrasting set of broadcasts they agree television had important effects. Gavin 
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Schaffer concludes that by ‘shaping’ how they understood the issue of immigration 
TV’s overall output ‘helped to set parameters of acceptability’ for indigenous viewers 
by confirming the alien status of Caribbean and Asian citizens.52 Christina Hodenburg 
suggests that in an era in which TV entertainment formed a ‘battleground in which 
boundaries were fought, levels of acceptability tested and raging controversies 
fought’ the popular situation comedy series Till Death Us Do Part (BBC, 1965-75) 
encouraged its white audience to be more racially intolerant.53  Finally Rob Waters 
argues that as a ‘central site for the imagination of community’ coverage of the Black 
Power struggle in the United States radicalized black British viewers’ understanding 
of themselves.54 In making their cases each historian confronted the same issue: the 
absence of wholly dependable and representative data. It is therefore worth 
rehearsing some of problems with which they struggled.  
 
Flawed sources 
BBC Audience Research Department surveys of viewers’ reactions to the 
Corporation’s programmes play an important role in Schaffer and Hodenburg’s 
accounts.55 The Department’s frequent reports were based on responses posted in 
from its long-established 2,000 strong panel of volunteers.56 They contain invaluable 
comments from people watching at home, just like every other member of the 
audience. Hood however claimed panelists were unrepresentative, and many of the 
comments contained in the reports do have a pronounced bourgeois tone. It is 
nonetheless hard to be precise about this bias as findings were rarely distinguished 
along class, gender or any other lines, adding a further limitation to their utility. The 
surveys were moreover conducted ex post facto. Panelists wrote up their opinions 
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after seeing a broadcast, meaning reports cannot measure a programme’s effect, as 
respondents were not assessed before watching it.57 Finally the reports were rarely 
longer than two sides of A4: such brevity means it is possible they say as much about 
the opinions of those responsible for compiling them as they do about the panelists.  
All three historians used letters written by viewers to broadcasters. These 
usefully supplement BBC audience reports.58 Yet, while providing further evocative 
qualitative data, correspondence is an even more problematic basis upon which to 
generalize, unless it is to illustrate as Schaffer puts it the ‘diverse and unpredictable’ 
nature of public opinion.59 For when compared to the millions who watched TV only 
a tiny number corresponded with programme makers: for example, despite the 
controversy surrounding Allen’s Days of Hope the BBC received just 131 letters.60 
Broadcasters were consequently doubtful about their value: Hood even dismissed 
such missives as ‘cries for help’.  
Waters is the only historian to use memory to establish his case, specifically 
that of a small handful of activists and artists, who could recall their response to key 
television moments, like the Black Panther salute at the 1968 Olympics.61 Setting 
aside concerns about the small numbers involved and their atypicality, memory 
presents dangers for those seeking to determine the wider ideological effect of 
particular broadcasts. Testimony can vividly suggest how one programme changed a 
life. But converts have often erroneously emphasized the impact of different kinds of 
text to explain in tangible terms their transformation.62 Without a bigger and 
controlled sample, or extensive biographical research to verify how TV interacted 
with the varied influences to which all individuals are subject, it is hazardous to take 
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respondents at their word, let alone to draw wider conclusions from their 
testimony.63   
 
The possibilities of the press 
Historians wanting to explore TV’s ideational effects therefore face sharp evidential 
problems; those cited above have done well to extract meaning from their material. 
Those wishing to go further have a choice. They can emulate those who have put 
aside positivist criticisms of the similarly problematic Mass-Observation Archive. 
That means embracing the subjectivity of the BBC audience surveys, letters and oral 
testimony to explore highly personal reactions to TV.64 Such an approach will likely 
produce thickly descriptive, highly illuminating histories of individuals’ engagements 
with the medium. But those who aspire to gain a broader understanding of TV’s 
impact on popular idea might want to go in another direction, one that 
accommodates at least some of the concerns of positivism. That is the ambition here 
and why the article argues for a more systematic use of the press.  
Newspapers figure prominently in all three accounts, in the form of readers’ 
letters, editorials, features and criticism. They play an especially important role in 
Hodenberg’s study, arguing as she does that the press influenced viewers’ reactions 
to what they saw on the screen.65 In this she follows the consensus amongst 
newspaper historians that, as Adrian Bingham has it, the press, being ‘right at the 
heart of British popular culture’, ‘helped to set the tone’ of vernacular discourse.66 
Indeed, Colin Hay even argues that the way newspapers reported the 1978-9 strike 
wave commonly known as the 'winter of discontent' directly encouraged the 
electorate to embrace Thatcher’s alternative to the post-war settlement.67 Even so, 
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Hodenburg does not mention in any particular way journalists whose job it was to 
review, criticize and in various other ways interpret TV for their readers. Yet, with 
the top eight national titles enjoying a combined sale in excess of 14 million per day 
during the 1970s, TV critics held a privileged cultural position. In response to its 
popularity every paper had expanded coverage of television, most employing at least 
two or three reviewers.68 Through their columns, often headed by a portrait, critics 
were personalities in their title’s universe, millions of readers’ daily interlocutor on 
the subject of television. Some were themselves TV celebrities: the Daily Mail’s Peter 
Black was so well known Rediffusion used him in commercials to praise their sets.69  
In spite of their importance, critics perform an inexact role in all three 
accounts. They are cited but with little sense of context: opinions are rarely linked to 
the title that employed them let alone to an appreciation of the number and type of 
readers for whom they wrote.70 Moreover, there is no exploration of the kind of 
relationship critics tried to build with readers: the ‘press and public’ or ‘critics and 
viewers’ are commonly presented as interchangeable.71 Finally, and most 
confusingly, these accounts frequently implicate critics in authorial assessments, 
using them to legitimize points the author wishes to make about a broadcast, 
thereby blurring the line between source and analysis.72  
This lack of specificity is unfortunate because, especially on the most popular 
dailies, critics aspired to intervene in readers’ conversations about TV. Thanks to 
Mass-Observation we know viewers of early 1950s television did not sit quietly 
observing the small screen: they spoke to each other.73 As the communications 
specialist David Morley established in the 1980s these dialogues helped audiences 
draw significance from what they saw.74 American evidence from the same decade 
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suggests that such discussions played a vital part in determining that significance.75 
Indeed, according to sociologists Laurie Taylor and Bob Mullan: ‘television drama has 
only properly occurred, been thoroughly realized, when the plots and the moral 
messages they contain have been discussed and interpreted and re-dramatised in 
the company of friends or mere acquaintances’.76  
Some broadcasts even provoked debates across the nation: as Hodenburg 
points out, one third of BBC audience panelists said they often discussed Till Death 
Us Do Part while most of the remainder claimed they did so at least occasionally.77 
Letters sent to the BBC confirm this proclivity, with one correspondent writing of the 
series Pennies From Heaven (BBC1, 1978): ‘An “in-depth” discussion took place each 
Wednesday morning in a local office of 20 bods, only three of us “oldies”. I think you 
might be surprised at the profundity of discussion.’78 The Head of BBC Children's 
Programmes even told colleagues that Griffiths’ play All Good Men (BBC1, 1974), 
‘started an argument among those watching with her which had gone on a long 
time’.79  
The content of these millions of private dialogues is however lost. The 
sources upon which historians might have relied to recover such conversations 
present stony ground. It is rare for diarists to record discussions about TV, and those 
few that do are, like the actor Kenneth Williams, exotically idiosyncratic.80 Nor do 
autobiographies mention viewing in detail. Some recent memoirs devoted to 
‘growing up watching telly’ say almost nothing about how broadcasts were 
discussed.81 In this bleak environment TV critics present the least-worst chance for 
historians to evoke the likely shape of such discussions.  
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The significance of the critic 
Historians of all stripes have generally ignored TV critics, especially those working for 
the popular press.82 Most simply disregard the influence of newspapers that sold 
millions of daily copies.83 But even newspaper historians have denigrated those parts 
of newspapers that focused on entertainment, seeing the expansion of this coverage 
during the 1970s at the expence of hard ‘news’ as a source of regret and a sign of 
the depoliticisation of the press.84 Described as ‘a forgotten part of our television 
culture’, it is therefore little wonder students of the media have only just started to 
rescue press TV critics from obscurity.85 Historians of 1970s TV drama are as guilty of 
this oversight as everybody else, with John Tulloch standing alone in recognizing 
their significance. Even so, being only interested in critics’ aesthetic judgements 
Tulloch focused on those employed by the comparatively little-read  elite press.86  
Critics worked for a press which during the 1970s was, partly in response to 
the increasingly troubled post-war settlement, increasingly partisan.87 All journalists 
operated within their newspaper’s persona, described by Stuart Hall as its ‘core 
values … which provide its staff and its readers with a coherent, if not consistent, 
scheme of interpretation’.88 Critics used this persona to establish a rapport with 
readers something so deeply ingrained they rarely felt the need to make explicit. 
Unusually Sean Day-Lewis of the Daily Telegraph – a paper that supported the 
Conservative party and whose readership was largely bourgeois – did once refer to 
‘we of the despised middle classes’ when reviewing Griffiths’ Bill Brand, a series he 
correctly judged was not meant for them.89 Yet, when prompting readers to see TV 
in particular ways critics were not always the unquestioning slaves of an editorial line 
or their readers’ presumed preferences.90 So as to retain rapport with readers, 
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maintain their personal integrity and not antagonize their Editor, critics could walk a 
narrow line. The Daily Express’ James Thomas for example clearly accepted the 
proposition illustrated in Allen’s The Spongers (BBC1, 1978), that many on state 
benefits were badly treated by the authorities. But bearing in mind how keenly the 
Express supported the Conservatives and the divisive nature of Allen’s argument, he 
tactfully concluded: ‘I imagine his audience would not find much to sympathy with 
it’.91 For the price of losing their readers’ affinity and straying too far from their 
title’s persona could be fatal. After being attacked by a correspondent for her 
‘bourgeois, maundering, subjectivism’, Tribune’s Audrey Williamson was quickly 
replaced by a more appropriate critic.92 
The BBC drama producer Irene Shubik claimed TV critics, ‘purport to be 
representatives of the people: “Mr Joe Average” reacting’.93 Those employed by 
popular titles tried to establish this persona by using the first person, colloquial 
language and humour, while referring to watching TV with their families, just like 
their readers. The Manchester Evening News’ Stanley Reynolds even reported on 
discussions about TV he had in his local pub.94 Critics also mentioned letters from 
readers who disagreed with their views to suggest they were but the first amongst 
equals. Certainly, despite working for the up-market Observer Clive James confirmed 
Shubik’s assertion when he asserted: ‘Television is for everybody. It follows that a 
television critic, at his (sic) best, is everybody too.’95 
Aiming to be regarded as the Everyman, critics ingratiated themselves into 
conversations about TV. Seeing his writing as ‘a necessary condiment to the 
watching of television’, while working for the Daily Mail and Sunday Telegraph, 
Philip Purser aimed, ‘to give enough account of the programme to catch the interest 
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of those who hadn’t seen it without boring those who had, and to register an 
opinion of it’. Significantly, Purser claimed his object was to ’pick up and continue 
whatever debate there had been round the set last night’.96 By employing these 
methods critics sought to act as opinion leaders within what in another context 
sociologist Janice Radway referred to as ‘interpretative communities’, which in their 
case could consist of millions.97  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
To reconstruct how critics tried to affect readers’ discussions about Allen and 
Griffiths’ work, analysis principally focuses on their series Days of Hope and Bill 
Brand. Broadcast over a protracted period weekly series gave critics time to reflect 
and allowed viewers the opportunity to discuss them. As Purser recalled of an 
installment in this genre: ‘People talked about it or thought about it between 
episodes, building up anticipation for what was to come. The audience did half the 
work.’98  
Being the two most popular papers of the period, focus falls on how critics 
working for the Daily Mirror and Daily Express framed these series.99 Each had well 
established and distinct personae, neither of which cared for socialism. The Mirror, 
with an average daily circulation in 1975 of 3.9 million was the country’s best-selling 
paper. It was also unique on Fleet Street in supporting the Labour party, usually 
taking the side of the party’s social democratic leaders against their left-wing critics. 
The paper had a ‘patriotic’ populist rather than class-conscious persona, and so 
invariably attacked demonstrators and strikers it described as ‘screaming 
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militants’.100 In contrast, the Express enjoyed a circulation of 2.8 million and was a 
redoubtable Conservative partisan, one wholly antipathetic to ‘class warfare’. If 
politically distinct, the papers had similar social constituencies although 85 per cent 
of Mirror readers came from the manual working class compared to the 60 per cent 
found reading the Express. As a result, both sets of critics addressed a largely 
proletarian audience, of the sort Allen and Griffiths wished to reach. 
What is referred to as ‘soft criticism’, that is stories related to TV but focusing 
on leading actors or the clothes they wore is also included within the analysis.101 The 
Mirror and Express enthusiastically indulged in this kind of coverage but it was 
something in which the listings magazines Radio Times and TV Times specialized. In 
1975 the former had a circulation of 3.5 million – it was Britain’s most read weekly – 
and at 3.3 million the latter was close behind. Respectively affiliated to the BBC and 
ITV, their main purpose was to find ways of inducing readers to watch their patron’s 
broadcasts. In that capacity they prompted audiences in how they should respond to 
Allen and Griffiths’ dramas.102  
 
Socialist dramatists 
During the 1970s Britain’s most popular TV fare consisted of the Miss World final, 
situation comedies, soap operas, Hollywood movies and light entertainment.103 This 
period is nonetheless now regarded as the ‘golden age’ of broadcasting because 
drama producers were relatively free of the traditional necessity to pander to the 
powerful and of what would later become tight commercial constraints.104 TV 
bureaucracies at this time were pretty informal: commissioning often occurred very 
quickly. Griffiths won the chance to write the pilot for Bill Brand over dinner with 
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just one Thames Television executive.105 Tony Garnett often eluded scrutiny from lax 
or easily duped BBC managers, which allowed him to produce Allen’s dramas almost 
uncensored.106 
This relative autonomy was nonetheless mainly confined to sharply 
delineated parts of the schedule, most notably The Wednesday Play/Play for Today 
series (BBC1, 1964-70/1970-84).107 As the BBC Head of Current affairs said in relation 
to complaints that Allen’s Big Flame constituted socialist propaganda, it was ‘not 
wrong to broadcast an occasional view that was entirely against the status quo in 
society in view of the fact that the implications of so much of the output were in its 
favour.’108 Indeed, a 1975 BBC survey estimated that during the previous two years 
the Corporation had broadcast just a dozen ‘political plays’.109 This still meant radical 
writers enjoyed a historically unprecedented chance to speak directly to millions and 
the possibility to, as the dramatist David Edgar put it, ‘inject socialist content into 
mass populist forms’.110 This was a limited opportunity about which Allen and 
Griffiths were not naïve. The former wrote The Talking Head (ITV, 1968), which 
explored the dilemmas of being a socialist and making TV drama. His scripts usually 
contained pointed references to how far television distorted reality for the benefit of 
the powerful. Griffiths’ work similarly highlighted the extent to which TV reinforced 
the status quo. He certainly appreciated how far television was the place where, 
‘people want fantasy. They don’t want their own lives exposed. It’s the way we have 
been shaped by years of the careless medium’.111  
Both used realism rather than experimental forms to ensure they spoke to 
the TV audience in familiar terms.112 Other socialist dramatists and critics censured 
them for that: they believed realism prevented audiences asking critical questions as 
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it diminished the possibilities of demonstrating contradiction.113 But when socialist 
drama abandoned realism, as in David Hare and Howard Brenton’s Brassneck (BBC1, 
1975), the results were not positive. Their play, about how a building contractor 
becomes rich through corrupting politicians of all parties, attacked the shortcomings 
of the post-war settlement as fervently as Allen and Griffiths but its experimental 
Brechtian techniques left BBC panelists confused and it was one of the worst 
received dramas in the history of Play for Today.114  
Like most other socialist writers Allen and Griffiths’ work was mostly 
restricted to single plays broadcast in The Wednesday Play/Play for Today slot. 
However, unlike their peers, they also each wrote a series: Allen penned the four-
part Days of Hope and Griffiths, the eleven-episode long Bill Brand. The former was 
broadcast in the Play for Today slot of 9.25 pm on Thursdays but Griffiths ensured 
his series ran at 9.00 pm on Mondays on ITV, an exceptional time for challenging 
drama on the commercial channel. He prevailed over schedulers who wanted to 
place the series after News at Ten, arguing: ‘my class, the people I want to talk to, 
don’t watch from 10.30 p.m.’115 Brand was nonetheless broadcast during the 
summer when viewing figures were at their lowest. 
Usually working with director Ken Loach and always with producer Tony 
Garnett, Allen’s plays relied on the techniques the pair made famous in Cathy Come 
Home (BBC1, 1967). To enhance realism they employed non-actors, outside 
locations and a way of shooting film then current in television news.116 Reflecting his 
Trotskyite background Allen’s scripts depicted trade union bureaucrats and social 
democratic Labour politicians as complicit with capitalism so they always betrayed 
those they were meant to represent. His dramas were nonetheless optimistic 
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inasmuch as they suggested that freed from these leaders and the illusions of 
parliamentarianism workers had the innate capacity to build a socialist society. 
Allen’s perspective was one with which Tony Benn had much sympathy.  
To illustrate his case, in The Big Flame (BBC1, 1969) Allen has a dock strike 
turn into workers’ control of the port of Liverpool. The army intervenes and while 
the dispute’s leaders are imprisoned they remain defiant, taking defeat as a strategic 
victory. Rank and File (BBC1, 1971) dramatized a real strike that broke out amongst 
once quiescent St. Helens glassworkers the year before: it showed labour movement 
representatives to be their enemy as much as their employers. Also mixing real and 
fictional events, Days of Hope surveyed British history from the Great War to the 
General Strike, culminating in what Allen presented as the Trades Union Congress 
and Labour establishment’s betrayal of striking miners. If set in the past, Allen 
declared, ‘The message is: don’t let it happen again’.117 He returned to a 
contemporary setting with The Spongers (BBC1, 1978), which traced the impact of a 
Labour council’s cuts to social services in line with edicts issued by the Callaghan 
government. Allen focused on how these harmed Pauline, a beleaguered single 
parent living on a council estate. Culminating in her suicide this was seemingly a play 
without hope although it ends with one of Pauline’s neighbours defiantly stating: 
‘she should have stayed and fought like the rest of us’.  
Griffiths’ largely studio bound work was more opaque exploring as it did the 
dilemmas faced by socialists in a democracy.118 If Allen’s work was dramatised 
Trotsky, Griffiths used Ralph Miliband’s Parliamentary Socialism (1961) a text then 
popular with the Labour left as the basis for his analysis. Certainly, his first television 
effort, All Good Men (BBC1 1974), took up a key Milibandian theme by suggesting 
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the Labour protagonist was so committed to the parliamentary road he had 
abandoned the working class. In the same year Griffiths wrote ‘Absolute Beginners’, 
broadcast as part of the BBC1 period drama series Fall of Eagles. This critiqued 
Lenin’s imposition on the Bolsheviks of his brutal notion of the centralized party. 
Thematically similar, Occupations (ITV, 1974) explored the Turin events of 1920 and 
showed a brusque Comintern agent pursuing Leninist realpolitik.  
Bill Brand in contrast explored the problems of the contemporary British left 
and many of the issues faced by the current Labour government. Brand was a newly 
elected MP, a former student militant who, like many of his real counterparts such a 
Ken Livingstone, joined Labour despite misgivings about its moderation. He enters 
the Commons with his government responding to an economic crisis by cutting 
welfare. Brand becomes involved in a leadership election and for a time it looks like 
MPs might elect a socialist. But instead they choose another social democrat who 
continues policies that hurt the working class so as to preserve the post-war 
settlement. Oftentimes Brand cuts an impotent figure but despite this, the series 
ends with him hopeful socialism might still happen. For his hitherto apolitical 
working-class brother has been radicalized after participating in a Right to Work 
demonstration. 
Reflecting his pluralist politics, Griffiths’ dramas were sometimes so subtle, it 
wasn’t always clear for whom viewers should be rooting. The arguments he has his 
social democrats and socialists advance were finely balanced while his heroes, most 
obviously Brand, were intellectuals wracked by uncertainty over how to mobilize the 
proletariat. In contrast, Allen’s work was, like his version of socialism, visceral, less 
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dilatory and had working people as their protagonists. If Griffiths posed agonized 
questions, Allen gave unambiguous answers.  
 Their dramatic and political approaches were distinct, but Allen and Griffiths 
each gave women roles more significant than other, almost exclusively male, 
socialist TV writers.119 Even so, the workplace setting of The Big Flame and The Rank 
and File relegated women to a domestic sphere Allen presents as impeding the class 
struggle. But in Days of Hope, Sarah Hargreaves has a crucial part as Allen’s 
mouthpiece and while The Spongers cast Pauline as victim her female neighbours are 
more robust. All of Griffiths’ principal protagonists were men, but women played 
noteworthy if subsidiary roles, most especially the radical feminist Alex Ferguson, 
Brand’s most articulate political critic. 
 
The audience for socialist drama  
The Joint Industry Committee for Television Advertising Research (JICTAR) published 
weekly lists of Britain’s twenty most popular programmes and one for the ten most 
watched in ITV’s fifteen regions. Neither Allen nor Griffiths featured in any of them. 
BBC figures however suggest that between 6.5 per cent and nearly 21 per cent of the 
population watched their dramas. This data does not reveal viewers’ demography 
but in dealing with the male-dominated world of politics and industrial conflict, it is 
likely their work disproportionately appealed to men. As The Spongers attracted the 
most viewers and exceptionally focused on a female protagonist in a domestic 
setting, it is arguable that had Allen and Griffiths included more important women 
characters in female-friendly contexts – as did soap operas - their work might have 
attracted bigger audiences.120 Significantly Griffiths’ most popular play during this 
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period, Through the Night (BBC1, 1975), had an archetypal female theme:  it was 
about a woman with breast cancer. Eleven million viewers watched and it sparked 
an extensive debate in the press about how the medical profession should treat 
women facing a mastectomy. This was a ‘political’ play insofar as it dealt with the 
power male doctors exerted over female patients, but few contemporaries 
recognized it as such.121  
A relatively low audience share was usual for all single plays: being one-offs, 
they did not benefit from the familiarity crucial to popularity. The performance of 
Days of Hope is therefore worth highlighting. The series had the potential to build an 
audience through holding a fixed place in the schedule. Yet, after its first episode, 
Days of Hope lost over a quarter of its viewers. This was partly due to being 
scheduled against The Morecambe and Wise Show, a well-liked light entertainment 
series, which started on BBC2 in its second week. Whatever the reason, with ITV’s 
adaptation of A.J. Cronin’s novel The Stars Look Down already established on 
Thursday nights at 9.00, Days of Hope condemned BBC1 to the rare fate of being the 
least watched of the nation’s three networks.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
As an ITV series, establishing the audience for Bill Brand is trickier but it can 
be estimated thanks to JICTAR.122 For the benefit of advertisers JICTAR established 
panels throughout ITV’s regions. But rather than providing an average of the number 
of viewers for a programme, like the BBC, JICTAR calculated how many households 
watched on a minute-by-minute basis. This allowed advertisers to know where best 
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to place commercials but it also gives historians a microscopic insight into viewer 
preferences. For the purposes of illustration, Brand’s performance in the Tyne Tees 
franchise has been selected, covering as it did the North East of England. With 75 per 
cent of the nearly 1,000 households forming the JICTAR panel designated as social 
class C2, D or E, this was ITV’s most proletarian region.  
Brand faced competition from the 9 O’clock News on BBC1 and, after 9.25, a 
feature film or sports broadcast; at the same time BBC2 repeated The Pallisers, a 
poorly received serial adaptation of Anthony Trollope’s political novels. Against this 
inauspicious competition it was still exceptional for Brand to attract a plurality of 
viewers, indeed that only occurred in its sixth week when BBC1 broadcast The Royal 
Horse Show. This was also one of the few weeks in which an episode gained viewers 
between the start and end of its transmission. When BBC1 ran a western or gangster 
movie however Brand lost a significant number of its audience. Like Days of Hope 
the series failed to build audience loyalty. From attracting 25 per cent of households 
at the start of its opening episode, Brand hit a peak of 30 per cent (against BBC1’s 
horses) in week six; but by the end of its final episode only 15 per cent were still 
watching. Due to the manner in which JICTAR presented its data it is hard to 
precisely calculate Brand’s weekly average audience, but it was close to 20 per cent 
of North East homes.  
Compared to the likes of Miss World, the audience for socialist drama was 
small, the absolute size for work that hitherto would have been mostly confined to 
non-commercial theatres, was greater than it had ever been. Poor though it was, 
had Brand’s performance in the North East been reproduced across Britain it would 
have attracted an average of eight million viewers every week.123 Similarly, if never 
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amongst the BBC’s most popular fare, audiences for Allen and Griffiths’ work ranged 
from three to nearly nine million.124 But how did those who watched receive these 
dramas? Given its reputation for dealing with controversial issues, audiences for the 
Wednesday Play/Play for Today slot were likely to have been the most appreciative 
of socialist drama. Yet, with only three channels from which to choose, even that 
strand attracted viewers for unlikely reasons: 22 per cent watched Days of Hope 
simply to pass the time while 32 per cent said it allowed them escape the pressures 
of life, an odd motive given its gritty subject matter.125  
Of those who watched All Good Men, the BBC survey claimed, ‘it seemed that 
political themes were not welcomed by a good many … in whose opinion they never 
make good entertainment, and tend to be particularly boring and depressing at the 
present time.’ Comments cited indicate some found Griffiths’ play heavy going, 
comparing it to an election broadcast and so, as one panelist claimed, not something 
they wanted to see ‘after a day’s work’.126 The report on The Big Flame suggested 
the audience was more equally divided. On the one hand were those who 
considered, ‘the present diet of head-line-hitting news about labour troubles was 
wearisome enough without a serving of plays on TV’; on the other some appreciated 
the insights Allen gave them into industrial conflict.127 Perhaps due to its domestic 
setting The Spongers report made no reference to criticism of its ‘political’ nature, 
instead claiming all but a few found it a ‘highly thought-provoking experience’.128 
Such variation could be due to the dramatic success or failure of the individual plays 
and how panelists’ comments were edited. But, if the exact proportion varied, it is 
clear that not everyone who watched socialist drama appreciated the experience. 
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The popular press encouraged this aversion. The elite Financial Times critic 
praised Griffiths’ Occupations, and called for more plays ‘of an uncompromisingly 
political nature’, but colleagues with mass circulations did the opposite.129 The 
Mirror’s TV coverage made it plain the paper believed the medium existed to 
provide readers with value-free amusement. Indeed as the newspaper historian 
A.C.H. Smith suggested, the Mirror’s heroes included ‘entertainers, the fun-makers 
of television’ as they accorded with its persona.130 Whatever was broadcast, the 
Mirror did its best to present TV in ‘showbiz’ terms. Photographs of attractive young 
female actors appearing in the production often partnered references to even the 
most heavyweight drama.  Tellingly, the only time the Mirror used a picture to 
accompany listings information for Brand it showed the MP (in the series very 
reluctantly) judging a beauty contest.131  
 
Bill Brand 
The Mirror was not alone in framing socialist drama in frivolous terms. In trying to 
drum up an audience, TV Times avoided as best it could Brand’s political content. 
Instead the weekly highlighted its protagonist’s personal ‘integrity’ and ‘idealism’ 
and stressed his soap-opera-style ‘complicated private life’. To further reinforce the 
impression the series was a conventional drama, TV Times even ran stories about its 
‘stars’, describing Jack Shepherd as a ‘cerebral sexpot’ and revealing the ‘strikingly 
attractive’ Lynne Fairleigh loved cats.132 
To an extent this framing was a consequence of Griffiths’ embrace of 
conventions common to popular TV drama, ones he used to establish a connection 
with viewers. This meant the series tackled Brand’s failing marriage and affair with a 
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younger woman played by Cheri Lunghi. Indeed to further leaven matters Brand and 
his lover, a Womens’ Studies lecturer, debate politics in bed, something that led to 
occasional nudity. These naked discussions troubled critics in the socialist press: the 
Communist Morning Star disapproved of this ‘touch of popular titillation’ while the 
left-Labour Tribune saw it as evidence Griffiths looked on women as ‘sex objects’.133 
In contrast, Tony Pratt of the Mirror approved, considering on more than one 
occasion, the ‘remarkably pretty’ Lunghi provided the only moments of relief in what 
he considered an otherwise dreary drama.134  
For Pratt Brand’s populism failed to sugar the pill of its otherwise challenging 
content. Wanting the series to raise critical questions in viewers’ minds, Griffiths’ 
dialogue did not simplify; as he said, those ‘who don’t know the political jargon will 
have to pick it up as they go along’.135 The basic issue with Brand, as with Griffiths’ 
work in general was however one of perspective. The series focused on how 
socialists should engage with the working class, not on how working people – and so 
most viewers - might relate to socialism. Notably, Brand’s unemployed brother starts 
the series politically disengaged, like many in the ITV audience. But the series 
presents him – and so them - as one of the problems the MP must negotiate on the 
road to socialism. This standpoint was probably why Brand was so popular with 
Labour MPs and prominent members of the International Marxist Group: it dealt 
with politics from their standpoint.136 These were however not the people Griffiths 
wanted to reach. The reaction of the Tyne Tees audience suggests working-class 
audiences were less impressed. A TV Times correspondent, who claimed to be a 
young working-class father, even sarcastically looked on Brand as ‘[y]et another 
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trendy, young, ex-working-class lefty’.137 It is a comment that betrays disaffection 
with Griffiths’ protagonist amongst those to whom he wished to appeal. 
In reacting to socialist drama, Mirror critics behaved as if raising political 
issues on TV was an abuse of a medium. But some went further to imply the subjects 
it tackled – in fact ‘politics’ as a whole - were an alien imposition on readers’ lives 
dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure. This was especially the case with Mary Malone, 
one of the few female critics of the time, who for years had led the charge against 
what she punningly referred to as ‘the Wednesday Plagues’.138 Of The Big Flame, she 
claimed most would turn to another channel if they were anything like her – and she 
always strove to establish they were – as ‘mention the Devlin Report to me, natter 
about clauses and amendments and I go sick and glassy-eyed’.139  
When Brand began its run, Malone looked on the MP as just one of those 
many parliamentarians, ‘who are so busy wrestling with inner torments it’s a wonder 
they have the time to get through all those bills telling us what to do’.140 She was not 
alone. A male colleague praised the series for giving viewers ‘an accurate glimpse 
into the corridors of power’, but still emphasized its ‘dullness’.141 So far as Malone 
was concerned, Griffiths’ series failed to connect with ‘us’. Writing on the day its 
final episode was broadcast, she inveighed: ‘A big weight is lifted from our viewing 
shoulders’.  ‘For the last time’, Malone continued, ‘you can feel your spirits sink as 
Trevor Griffiths’s tutorial on political in-fighting resumes’, describing it as presenting 
a ‘picture of Westminster as a game only politicians can play. They are the actors – 
and their own audience’.142  
There were issues with Griffiths’ perspective that might have alienated 
working-class viewers. But Malone and colleagues chose to further estrange Mirror 
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readers from the series and discourage them from reflecting on their subordinate 
place within Westminster politics, one of the key themes it explored. Instead, and in 
line with their papers persona, they presented Brand as actually confirming their 
readers’ disaffection, not just from the socialism Griffiths hoped to advance but from 
‘boring’ politics as a whole. It was perhaps no wonder so many preferred to watch 
Westerns.  
 
Days of Hope 
Due to the implacable nature his work, Allen provoked greater controversy than 
Griffiths. As BBC audience reports suggest, his dramas divided viewers. One said of 
Days of Hope, it ‘brought tears to my eyes, hate for the army and pity for the people’ 
and another claimed it ‘left me feeling angry and frustrated’. Others however were 
left irate by Allen’s ‘blatant propaganda’ and ‘persistent bias against parliamentary 
government’.143  
As middle-class professionals, critics were aware that in Allen’s Manichean 
world they existed on the dark side. Writing for predominantly bourgeois readers, 
the Sunday Telegraph’s Purser admitted The Rank and File initially made him 
sympathize with the workers’ individual plights. But once they went on strike and 
‘coalesced together, jeering and shouting slogans and drumming up solidarity … I 
began to grow restive with a line drawn so absolutely between right and wrong’.144 It 
was to be expected that James Thomas of the Express would dismiss The Big Flame 
as ‘a blatant piece of propaganda for Communism’.145 But its relentless nature also 
provoked the Mirror’s Malone to attack its case for workers’ control of industry. 
Temporarily abandoning her congenial apolitical persona, she lectured the paper’s 
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overwhelmingly working-class readers that bosses were a fact of life. Claiming Russia 
was the only country that had ever abolished them, Malone concluded, ‘and look at 
the trouble they have been going through since 1917’.146  
Malone was also at pains to ensure Mirror readers appreciated The Big Flame 
was not reality. The class-conscious character of Allen’s dramas meant they would 
have been attacked whatever method was used, but Loach’s realist techniques 
added to their contentious nature. The Big Flame was twice postponed because BBC 
executives claimed it looked too much like the news and might mislead the 
audience.147 If viewers did not confuse Allen’s fiction with fact, the form of their 
presentation certainly gave his message greater weight. Of The Big Flame one BBC 
panelist commented: ‘we could almost smell the odours of mixed cargoes unloading, 
the garbage of the Liverpool dockland and the squalor of the workers’ environment. 
Helped us sympathize with the struggling individuals’.148  
Of all Allen’s dramas, Days of Hope generated the greatest storm, the 
broadcasting of which, a Daily Telegraph editorial claimed, proved a ‘Left-wing 
consensus’ prevailed at the BBC.149 Edited by the former Conservative minister Bill 
Deedes, the Telegraph vigorously attacked the series, with its critic Richard Last 
describing it as: ‘an unashamed party political broadcast for the Communist party – 
the most prolonged commercial the comrades have enjoyed since the media were 
invented’.150 Allen having urged viewers to draw lessons about the present from the 
history he depicted, detractors exploited its most minor mistakes – such as how 
soldiers marched and their length of hair - to undermine his message.151 As that 
which Garnett called ‘a statement on behalf of organized working people’, it was no 
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coincidence the only critics to think Days of Hope an accurate rendition of the past 
worked for Tribune and the Morning Star.152 
Staying true to their general approach, the Mirror’s critics avoided discussing 
the series as a political text. Instead they judged it as an entertainment, and found it 
wanting. Ken Irwin wrote of the first episode: ‘There is plenty of atmosphere, 
hundreds of “extras” and some very poignant scenes’, summing it up as: ‘Terrific. But 
too long’.153 His colleague Kenneth Hughes noted the ‘great deal of fuss’ others in 
the media had made about its ‘Left-wing leanings’. His view was nonetheless limited 
to the ostensibly dramatic – but clearly political - judgment that it was ‘flawed by 
pointing up too sharply the goodness of the goodies and the ridiculing of the upper-
class establishment baddies.’154  
Reflecting their paper’s distinct persona critics working on the Daily Express 
reacted differently. They did not necessarily have a principled opposition to socialist 
drama that mixed fact with fiction. The year before Days of Hope was broadcast 
James Thomas had welcomed Griffiths’ Occupations, as ‘a record of a slice of 
history’.155 But as a one-off play, set in Italy five decades in the past, and shown late 
on Bank Holiday Sunday evening Occupations had no chance of attracting a mass 
audience. Days of Hope in contrast asked pressing questions about contemporary 
Britain, at prime time and for four weeks. So, Express critics set about systematically 
highlighting what they claimed were its biases. Even summaries on the paper’s 
normally purely descriptive TV listing pages told readers of its ‘less than accurate 
history’. In this way they were repeatedly informed that the series represented 
Allen’s biased views wrapped up in an ‘apparently documentary form’, so they 
should not confuse it with the actual past.156 
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At the series’ conclusion, James Murray even gave readers an alternative 
historical interpretation of the events depicted in what he called ‘the Left-wingers’ 
favourite show’. According to him, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin was ‘a cool Tory 
pragmatist’ who outwitted union leaders unwilling to lead their members into 
‘anarchy’. The General Strike ended, Murray argued, because after nine days ‘Britain 
had tasted enough of revolution’. If Allen  ‘saw a restoration of order as a betrayal of 
the working classes by their leaders and their rulers’, he went on, ‘[t]he piece had 
another lesson, though. Argue and squabble we may, but the British gift for common 
sense overcomes fevered tribulation. The hot-heads may bay for blood, but hot air 
does not make revolution.’157 So far as Express readers were concerned, therefore, 
Days of Hope was the occasion for their instruction in a traditionally patriotic view of 
history, a version of the past – and so of the present - that completely refuted the 
one advanced by Allen.    
After its first episode Murray claimed he doubted viewers would draw the 
conclusions the makers of ‘one of the most impressive-looking political series we’ve 
seen on television’ hoped they might.158 He and his colleagues certainly tried to 
ensure that was true of Express readers, but the Radio Times performed a similar 
function for its audience. As was usual at the start of any major series, Allen, Loach 
and Garnett were interviewed to publicise Days of Hope. During this they claimed 
the ending of the General Strike was a betrayal that prefigured the treachery of 
1970s Labour leaders. But, in an unprecedented step, in the ensuing article journalist 
Neil Lydon attacked the series. He claimed that as history it was spurious while its 
politics meant the series was dramatically weak, stating, ‘it tries to make flesh of an 
idea – or, rather, of a series of political ideas held in conflict with each other by the 
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leading characters’. Such ‘dramatised political disputes’ he maintained ‘lack[ed] the 
edge of reality’.159 Even before it had begun, Radio Times readers were therefore 
told by the BBC’s own in-house publication to regard Days of Hope skeptically.  
 
Conclusion 
Looking back on this period Jim Allen’s producer Tony Garnett recalled: ‘Those were 
days of such revolutionary optimism that I thought we could make one film and 
change the world.’160  Neither Allen nor Trevor Griffiths were ever so sanguine. But 
they did hope that writing for television would contribute to their viewers’ 
radicalization, something Margaret Thatcher, for one, feared might happen. 
Other socialist dramatists believed TV was the wrong medium for those 
seeking to win audiences over to radical ideas. David Edgar believed the theatre was 
the only venue for that, arguing most people watched television in, ‘the atomized, a-
collective arena of the family living room’ where they were ‘at their most 
conservative and reactionary’.161 Edgar was right inasmuch as television was 
generally watched at home in small groups. But as various social scientists have 
indicated that was just the start of the discursive process through which ideas 
achieved their full meaning. For, as the critic Stanley Reynolds, remarked in 1976: 
‘The best TV is always what everyone is talking about the next day.’162 Weekly series, 
such as Bill Brand and Days of Hope, were especially likely to generate debate. 
Indeed, one reason for watching the latter, offered by nearly half of those surveyed 
by the BBC, was that it gave them something about which to talk with friends.163 
According to the Daily Mail critic Shaun Usher, writing halfway through its run, Days 
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of Hope, undeniably supplied its audience with something to discuss as it ‘is doing 
the apparently impossible – making ordinary folk think and argue about politics’.164 
As their main function was to ingratiate themselves into discussions about 
TV, the columns of newspaper critics give historians their least-worst chance of 
establishing the possible shape of these arguments, and so the ultimate effect of 
Allen’s and Griffiths’ work. As with all forms of cultural history – including of course 
television - there is no absolutely definitive evidence as to how those who wrote for 
the press influenced their readers.165 Adrian Bingham suggests the press ‘reflected 
and shaped’ attitudes but concedes it lacked the ability to coerce readers into 
accepting its point of view.166 Operating with different methods, social scientists 
have however established that the press can affect how people think about a variety 
of subjects.167 They have also produced evidence that press criticism in particular can 
influence audiences’ understanding of TV drama.168 There are then grounds for 
believing that the critics highlighted here held some way over their readers. Given 
the nature of the subject and of the sources, reference to critics cannot however be 
a panacea for historians struggling to define the ideological impact of TV. But by 
assessing their output in a systematic manner they can establish, case by case, the 
bounds of speculation, to at least better define the likely parameters of those 
millions of discussions in which reviewers wished to participate. To be blunt, 
historians have two choices: make the best use of the imperfect material they have 
to hand or abandon themselves to pure conjecture.  
We should not be surprised the critics discussed here encouraged readers to 
reject the implications of socialist drama. Stuart Hall saw the ‘ventriloquists of 
populist opinion’ in the press as crafting ideas amenable to the radical right.169 In 
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particular, Colin Hay suggests that during the ‘winter of discontent’ the Express and 
Mirror helped concoct a spurious narrative in which Britons were held hostage by 
the trade unions. It was a story that made Thatcher’s attack on the post-war 
settlement more plausible and so significantly improved her chances of election.170  
But this role was anticipated some years before when Britain appeared threatened 
by dramatised versions of the same militant labour movement. This more insidious 
and everyday ideological battle was fought not on the front pages of the nation’s 
press but inside, in the columns of their television critics; nor was it conducted just 
for the few weeks during the winter of 1978-9 but over many years.  As this article 
confirms, these entertainment pages, which post-war surveys show always attracted 
most readers’ attention, could be just as political as those dedicated to 
Westminster.171  
On their own a few TV plays promoting socialist ideas were never going to 
revolutionise Britain’s ideological landscape nor did the implacable rejection of these 
ideas by press TV critics make Thatcher’s 1979 election inevitable. What they reveal 
however is evidence that a battle of ideas was being fought in what even today some 
political historians might consider the unlikeliest parts of the national culture. Well 
beyond Peter Hall’s rarefied ‘marketplace for ideas’ ordinary Britons were debating 
the nature of their governance as the post-war settlement cracked. Allen and 
Griffiths took their chance to influence vernacular political ideas on a mass scale, to 
restock the cultural “tool kit” of which Anne Swidler referred. But against them 
stood those who wished to redirect their millions of readers in a different direction. 
Such a debate played no direct part in the shift from the state to the market in public 
policy engineered by the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. But it reveals some of 
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the grounds on which she pitched her appeal in May 1979 when as Stuart Hall put it 
the Conservative leader translated for the sake of the electorate, ‘economic doctrine 
into the language of experience, moral imperative and common sense’.172 
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Table 1: Percentage of Readers of selected Newspapers and Listing Magazines by 
Gender and Social Class in 1975 
 
  Male Female A B C1 C2 D E 
Daily 
Express 54 46 2.7 11.8 28.7 30.8 17.9 12.4 
Daily 
Mirror 55 45 0.5 3.9 18.8 41.5 28 16.4 
Radio 
Times 46 54 4 16.2 28.7 27.3 16.5 16.7 
TV Times 46 54 2.1 10.9 25.6 32.2 21.2 15.4 
 
Source: National Readership Survey. 
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Table 2: The TV Audience for Work by Jim Allen and Trevor Griffiths 
 
 
Source: BBC Audience Research Department reports; JICTAR, Weekly TV Audience 
Reports; and Social Trends 39 (HMSO, 2009), p. 14. 
Year of first broadcast Allen Griffiths  
1969 The Big Flame (BBC1) 
13.6% (5.75m) 
 
1970   
1971 Rank and File (BBC1)  
6.9% (3m) 
 
1972   
1973   




Absolute Beginners (BBC1) 
% N/A (but 4.5m) 
1975 Days of Hope (BBC1),  
4 parts 
1: 9.5%  (4m)  
2: N/A 
3: 6.5% (2.75m)  
4: 7.1% (3m) 
 
1976  Bill Brand (ITV),  
11 parts 
Average: 20% (8.25m) 
1977   
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